Domestic vs. international explanations of recent U.S. manufacturing developments by John A. Tatom
FEDERAL RESERVE EANFh OF ST WIlls APRIL 1955
Domestic vs. International




HE value of the U.S. dollar iti foreign exchange
marketsrose sharply fi’oni 1980 to 1985, prompting the
emergence ofa hypothesis that links the growth ofthe
nation’s manufacturing sector and developments in
the foreign exchange market. This hypothesis holds
that the appreciation of tile dollar has raised the cost
of U.S. goods, especially ntanufactured goods. to un-
competitive levels in the world market.’ As a result,
manufacturing output in the United States has stag-
nated, especially relative to manufacturing in compet-
ing nations.
‘t’his international explanation suff’ers from a corn-
mon analytical problem in economic analysis: the
failure to distinguish between supply and! demand
changes. in the simplest analysis, for example, an
increase in the supply of a product, given prices, is
expected to reduce tlte price of the product so that
purchasers will be induced to buy more. Thus, the
price falls, just as it would if demand felt at initially
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‘The internationat explanation applies to all goods and services,
though manufacturing is typically singled out because such goods
constitute a relatively large shareof U.S. exports and imports. Since
1980, the international hypothesis has become increasingly popular,
and in recent years it has been presented in virtually every national
magazine and newspaper. Lawrence (1984) is an advocate of this
view. This is somewhat surprising, since he also emphasizes the
importanceof the cyclical view of manufacturing developments in the
1970s and links the decline in the dollar in the 70s to the relative
weakness of U.S. manufacturing productivity. Solomon (1985) and
Fieleke (1985) also discuss the international view and provide evi-
dence that is at odds with it.
unchanged prices. The principal difference is this:
when a cost or pi-oductivity shift initiates the price
reduction, the industny expands;when a demand shift
initiates the price reduction, the industiy sht-inks.
The international hypothesis focuses on the effects
of an exchange rate change only on the demand for
goods. But ifthe supplyof output grows in one country
because of an increase in its resources orproductivity.
the pricesof affected products will fall and the domes-
tic industry will expand. A rise in the exchange rate
then wilt be required to restore the equality ofproduct
prices across countries. Thus, it is not necessarily
correct to expect that an appreciation of the dollar
reduces the output and employment of domestic ex-
porters and import-competing firms.
What’s more, adecline in U.S. manufacturing output
can occur as much due to a shift in domestic demand
as foreign demand. ‘this point is part of the domestic
view of U.S. manufacturing output fluctuations, which
emphasizes the sensitivity of manufacturing to cycli-
cal movements in U.S. real income and the importance
of supply changes in alter ng the exchange i’ate.~
2Norton (1986) agrees with Lawrence that, in the 1970s, adverse
movements in U.S. manufacturing output and employment were the
result of domestic ‘cyclical effects,” while, in this decade, they have
been the result ofshort-run trade effects associated with macroeco-
nomic policies that presumably raised the value of the dollar. But
Norton also notes two influential studies that dismiss the “overval~
ued dollar” view and argues that such a view is too simple and
ignores the fact that a “depreciating dollar is a sign of decline” (p.
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This article suggests that rnauufacttiring output in
the United States has not been systematically weak-
ened during the period ofdollarappreciation. Instead,
it has been stronger than gains in domestic income
alone can expkun. On the denian d side, domes tic
cyclical movements in real income provide the best
explanation for manufacturing growth in the first half
of this decade because they account for both the slow
and the boom periods that, on net, Itare left manufac—
turitig Outtiut above its 1948—SO average share of the
nation’s output. ‘the article also suggests that cr0—
uuuuc policy has bad supply—side effects on U.S. man—
ufacturing that not only impnm’ed the interuational
competitive position of the I niled States, hut also
raised! the value of the dollar.
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volatile since 1980. Chart t shows output and employ—
niient in the manufacturing sector, Output is gross
domestic product originating in manufacturing It982
lir’i~es1orreai valtie—added in that sectoi’, From 1947 to
1979, uuuiufact uning output grewat a 3 ti percent rate,
hut emplanter tt rose iiinch 1110res Iuwl~’ , averagir ig a
0.9 pen-cent rate of growth over the period. Since then,
there have been periods of declining output It/I980 to
Itt/I 980 and 111/1981 to tV/I 9821, relatively slow growth
lilt/I 984 to IV/ 19851 antI rapid advance IIV/1982 to 111/
19841. in the recent per’iod of slow growth. nianufac—
turing ou[put exp~tndlml at only a 1 .5 ~ie cent rate,
while employment fell by 131,60(1 per~ohs, a t).5 per-
cent rate of decline.
The periods of declining, n’elatively slow and fast
growth of manufacturing in the 1980s closely follow
cyclical niovements iii dontestic neal income. As chart
2 shows, dlUring the shaded recession periods real
icome IGNPI declines, but manufacturing output
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Manufacturing output in the United States has beenFEDERAI_ RESERVE EANKOFEI’, LOLIIE
Chart 2




falls even more; dltrning periods when real GNP grows
relatively rapidly, mantrfactttring otttpnt gn’oWth tends
to be stronger’.
‘there are two pr-incipal explanations for’the cs’clical
sensitivity of manufacturing output. The Iirst, called
the ‘‘per-manent income’’ hypothesis, emphasizes that
when r-eal income is temporan-ilv depressed. ptir’—
chases of durable manufactured goods tend to be
postponed; when real iricortie is temporarily highen’.
most of the income gain is saved forfuture consurnp—
tion, including saving in the form of durable goods
acquisition: lie second explanation emphasizes the
1-esponsi\.’eness of supply to price changes. Variations
in demand, including those due to cyclical real in—
rome changes, have little effect on the prices of goods
whose supply is \‘er’\’ responsive to price. The supply
3See Milton Friedman (1957). The pioneering application of this
concept to the demandfor durable goodsis developed by Harberger
(1960) and the studies therein,
of other goods is r-elatively tess responsive to price
var-iation, and these goods show gr-eater price yar-iahll-
ity when teat itironie fluctuates. ‘the manufactum-ing
sectoris usually characterized as having t-elativelv less
flexible prices so that variations itt demand affect
output n’elatively more and price r-etativeiy tess, than
in other sector’s of the economy.4
The experience of the 1980s appear-s to tie consist-
ent with the previous cyclical experience. The recent
intervals of stow or negative gr-owth appear’ to be due
to cyclical niovernents in real iticome. But the cyclical
volatility in chan-t 1 may be obscuring a general ten-
dency Ion’manufacturing output growth to have been
depressed liv the rise in the value of the dollar.
‘Okun (1981) develops aggregate theories of price adjustment and
cyclical behavior based on the distinction between what he called
“flex-price” and “tixed-price” industries. The elasticity ofsupply in a
competitive industry plays only a minor role in this work, Other
factors, such as the objectives of firms and degrees of competitive-
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An appreciation in the value of the dollar is fre-
quently blamed for’ recent weakness in the growth of
U.S. manufacturing output. When the price of the
dollar in units of foreign cun’r-ency n-ises, the prices of
U.S. goods measun’ed in fot-eign currencies also in-
crease, given the dollar prices of those goods. On the
other hand, foreign currencies become cheaper, mak-
ing the dollar’prices of foreign goods tower. Asaresult.
both foreigners arid domestic residents buy fewer’ 1,1_S.
goods and more fot-eign goods. From the U.S. point of
view, exports fall, while impor-ts of foreign goods
increase.
As chart 3 shows, the marked appreciation in the
value of the dollar began in tate 1980 and continued
until the fir-st quarter of 1985. Over the period, the
exchange n-ate rose fairly steadily at a 14.4 percent
annual rate. Over- the remaining threequarter-s of 1985.
the value of the dollar fell at a26 percent rate, reaching
an end-of-year’ value near’ its early 1983 level. The
earlier rise in the dollar’s value has been held respon-
sible for the dismal per-for-nuance in manufacturing,
and the same view suggests that the recent depi-ecia-
tion will lead to renewed strength.~
51n principle, the appropriate measure of the exchange value of the
dollar is the “real”exchange rate, which takes into account changes
in U.S. and foreignprices. Forexample, the real exchange rate rose
at a 13.2 percent rate over the period 11/1980 to 1/1985. The
difference between the growth rates of the nominal and real ex-
change rate reflects an average annual rate of price increase
abroad that was about 1.1 percent per year higher than in the United
States, Forempirical purposes, there is little difference between the
two series. From 1/1970to 111/1985, a regression of the growth in the
real exchange rate on a constant and the growth rate ofthe nominal
exchange rate, with significant autocorrelation correction, accounts
for 97 percent of the variation in the real exchange rate. Of course,
the coefficient on the nominal exchange rate is not significantly
differentfrom one.
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While manufacturing output gr-owth has had peri-
ods ofweakness in the 1980s, it has not been uniformly
slow. Front 111/1980 to 1/1985, the period of strong
appreciation, manufacturing output rose at a 4 per-
cent n-ate. Such gr-owth is han-dly weak compared with
the ear’lier recon’d for such grxiwth. More important, to
the extent that the dollar appreciation explains the
1984—85 weakness in manufacturing, the effect was
mysteriously late.
As chart 4 shows, the shan-eofmanufactured output
in n-cal (iNP since 1948 is strongly cyclical. Fnoni 1980
‘Jonas (1986) discusses the unchanged share of manufacturing
output in real GNP but argues that a declining share of nominal
spending on manufactured products is more relevant. He cites a
Congressional Budget Office view that supports this. But, ot course,
the declining share of nominal spending reflects the difference in
these two measures, the continuing historical decline in the price of
U.S. manufactured products relative to output prices generally. The
latter is correctly regarded to be a signof the strength of the growth
of productivity and output in this sector,
to 1982, when real income growth declined, this share
fell sharply. Front‘1982 to 1984, when real income gr’ew
r-apidly, it rose. The recentslow growth in manufactur-
ing output,which appear’s to be concentr-ated in) 1984—
85 and earlier’ in 1980—82. is not sun’prising in light of
the relatively slow growth in r’eal GNP over’ the same
periods. Moreover, the share of manufacturing output
in n-eat GNPhas n-emained steady recently and does not
appear’ low t-elative to the previous experience?
The casual evidence above indicates that the an-
swer to this question is no. the questioti can also be
‘From 1/1948 to Ill/i 980, the average level of the share ofmanufac-
turing output in real GNP was 21.4percent, while the averagelevel
of the Federal Reserve indexofcapacity utilization,a measure ofthe
cycle, was 82.8 percent. Over the period Ill/i 984 to lV/1985, the
utilizationrate was somewhat lower, averaging80.6 percent, but the
share of manufacturing output was higher,averaging 21.9 percent.
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A mon’e l’igorous test should take ir’tto account the
strongly cyclical tiehavior of manufacturing output
gr’owth. Alter’ all, in the ean’lier period, the capacity
utilization r’ate was little changed at 77.0 percent
11/1976) and 77.1 per-cent Ill t/1980), while in the more
r’ecent period it rose slightly to 80.5 percent 1/1985).
Such a cyclical improvement con.nld lie expected to
raise manufactur’ing output gn-owth in the n’ecent pe—
nod relative to the ear-lien’ l.ieriod.
To assess the exchange rate hypothesis, the rela-
tionship between mann~rfactun’ingoutput gr’owth arid
n’eal GNP was fin’st established for’ the period fr-om
llt/1947 to 111/1980. i’his relationship is:
1) 400~lnXM,= — 4128 + t.745 400MnX/
—5.60) )13.40)
‘A search of the lagged relationship between XM and X up to four
past quarters was conducted. Only one past value is significant for
real GNP. Virtually the same results are obtained using quarterly
industrial production growth on the left-hand-side ofequations 1 and
2. The factthat XM is acomponent of X cannot influence the results
here. To verify this, the results in this section were examined using
compounded annual rates ofchange and decomposing real income
growth into the lagged share of manufacturing output in real GNP
times the growth rate of manufacturingoutput and a corresponding
product for nonmanufacturing output. This allows the removal ofthe
current period’s manufacturing output growth from the right-hand-
side of equation 1. The hypothesis that the effect of weighted past
growth in manufacturing or nonmanufacturing output is the same
could not be rejected and none ot the results reported here were
affected.
Table 1
Actual and Predicted Manufacturing
Output Growth
- Actual -. Predicted - Error
IV 1980 i3~C 48-c 890,
11981 31 11 1 86
II 2.! 28 54
III 26 17 43
IV 1-16 131 ‘5
1982 99 175 76
II 48 50 02
24 9.1 67
IV 65 46 19
11983 12.2 3.0 92
II 1.46 27 1.9
III 189 73 1t6
IV 99 13 ‘4
11984 149 ‘8.5 37
Il 76 98 22
III 71 1.6 53
IV 00 21 21
11985 10 25 15
II 20 05 25
III 30 lb i.~
IV 13 14
Mean 36 16 20
Root-Moan Squared-Error 5 07
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addressed by coniparing manufacturing oirtput
growth in the 1980s with that from 1976 to 198(1 when
thedollarwas fatling.Front 111/1980 to 1/1985, rnanufac—
turing output gr-ew at a 4,0 per-cent i-ate; this was the
I 8—quar-ter- period overwhich the exchange r’ate ofthe
dollar r-ose tiy 83 pertent. Oven’ the preceding 17 quar’—
ten-s 11/1976 to lit/I 980), the exchange r-ate fell by about
20 percent, but narnnfactnring output gr-ew at only a
2.0 per-cent i-ate. The growth of nmnufactur-irig output
was stronger dur’ing ther-ecent period ofdollar’ appr’e—
ciation than it had been over’ the previrius per’iod of
dollar depr’eciation. Ifthere is a relationship between
changes in) the value of the dollar and in mant.rfactun-—
ing output, it appear-s to lie a positive one, not the
negative one cited by recent analyses.
+ 0.485 )40oMnx,_,~,
3.72)
SE 6.37 5’ = 0.66 tJW = 1.92
when-c XM is manufactur-ing output and X, is real GNP
in) quar’ter’ t; growth r-ates an’e measur-ed as 400 times
the diffen-erce in the logar-ithru of the output senies,
which provides continuously compounded gr-owth
rates.’ The standard en-or (SEt, Th arid tjun-bin—Watsonr5r/FR/4L RESERVE RANK OR EL 505(5
past five year-s than the prror cyclical r-elationsiup
would predict. Oven’ the r-ecent period ofweak mariu—
facturing growth, Itl/1984—tV/1985, when it aver-aged
only a 1.5 percent rate, the predicted gn-owth rate
based on n’eal GNP growth alone was about zero. Thus,
even Over’this pen-iod , manufacturing riutp ut was rela—
tivelv sti-ong.’
To lest the exchange n-ate hypothesis, the growth
r-ate ofthe exchange value rifthe dollar (400~lnEX,rwas
added to theequation. ‘The exchange n-ate hypothesis
indicates that, given GNP growth, art appreciation of
the dollar should weaketi manufacturing output
growth the coefficient should be negative.
When the full period fioni ttl/1947 to tV/1985 is used,
the results ar-c significantly counter to the exchange
rate hypothesis. ‘i’heestimate is:
(2) 400MnxM = —2.95 + 1.52 400AInX,i
— 3.95) (10.95)
+ 0.59 (400MnX, — , + (1.095 400 MnEx,
4,22) 2.00)
.71
Only the exchange i-ate thn-ee quar-ter-s earlier- exhibits
any significant relationship with manufacturing out-
put. so other’ lags have been omitted. Equation 2 indi-
cates that ther-e is a positive, not a negative, nelation—
ship between the exchange value of the dollar ard
manufactut-ing output)’ Thus, the strength of the cx-
change i-ate over- the past live year’s has been associ-
ated with a significant lioost in manufacturing output
growth. Apparently, the appreciation of the dollar
has been associated with economic developments
that wei-e expected to i-aise U.S. productivity. While
equation 2 n’ehites the exchange n-ate hypothesis, the
positive r-elationship between tire exchange rate and
manufacturing output warn-ants mon-eexplanation.
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The exchange rate hypothesis is based on the link
between tile exchange n-ate and relative demands for
prodticts. But, over the past five yeans, the exchange
n-ate has moved opposite to that expected based on
demand conditions in goods markets alone.
‘[‘he exchange rate, like any pr-ice, is deter-mined by
supply and demand. Focusing initially only on the use
of the dollar to facilitate inter-national goods transac-
tions, the demand fora flow ofdollar-s in international
exchange depends on the dollar’ value of for-eign de-
niand foi 11.5.goods. Given other factor-s that influence
this demand, tile quantity demanded vanies inversely
with the valueof the dollar. When theforeign currency
pr-ice of the dollar’ rises, U.S. goods tiecome mor-e
expensive to foreigners and they r-educe their pun--
chases; thus, the quantityof dollar-s demanded to pay
for- our expon-ts falls.
Sin ilarly, a rise in the exchange value ofthe dollar
n-educes the dollar’ pt-ices of goods imported from
abroad. This pr-()mpts r-esidetlts to buy tnore for-eign
goods on- increase imports. Thus, tile quantity of do!-
tars supplied to pay for- increased U.S. imports would
rise with the exchange n-ate.4 Equilibrium occurs
SE = 5.04 OW = 2.12
‘Solomon (1985) and Lawrence have noted the strength ot U.S.
industrial production growth in the early 1 980s, based on the annual
relationship of such growth tothegrowth rateof real GNP from 1951
to 1981.
‘°Asearch of up to four lags of the exchange rate movement was
conducted. The same test was done using the real exchange rate,
but the results are nearly identical since movements in the nominal
and real exchange rate have been about the same.
“It is conceivable that a rise in the exchange rate has its dominant
impact on real income, and that manufacturing adjusts in line with
equation 1. But such a result is atodds with the notion that exchange
rate movements have a disproportionate effect on manufacturing,
beyond those associated with any induced cyclical movements in
U.S. real income. This possibility is also at odds with the paucity of
evidence supporting the hypothesis that exchange rate movements
affect real GNP. The ambiguity of the evidence on this issue has
been noted by Anderson (1985)-A simple testof the hypothesis is to
regress the growth rateof real GNP on current and past changes in
the exchange rate and a constant over the period when the ex-
change rate changes, l/1967—IV/1985. There are no significant
exchange rate effects in such an investigation for up to four lagged
values of exchange rate movements, even when they are entered
separately or in groups of up tofive terms.
“The positive relationship between U.S. manufacturing output and
the exchange rate is not a recent development. For the 1947—80
period, the estimate in equation 2 is virtually the same asthat shown
for the longer period, and the exchange rate coefficient and lag
structure is the same and similarlysignificant. Tests ot whether the
coefficients in equations 1 or 2 changed after exchange rates began
to move more freely in 1/1973 indicated that there were no such
changes. Of course, other factors, such as protectionistchanges in
U.S. trade policy like voluntary export restraint agreements on
Japanese autos, may have contributed totherecent strengthof U.S.
manufacturing, but in the aggregate data, this is not apparent.
“An in-sample experiment using equation 1 shows the other side of
this relationship. Most of the previous decline in the trade-weighted
value of the dollar occurred from ll/1976 to 11/1978. During this
period, U.S. real income experienced a strong cyclical recovery,
rising at a continuous rate of 4,9 percent. Using equation 1, the
predicted growth rate in manufacturing output is 11 percent, but
such growth was only 6.9 percent overthe period.
“This requires that the increased volume of purchases more than
offsets the decline in the dollar price of imported foreign goods.APR01’
1980
where the supply and demand for dollars in the for-
eign exchange market are equal at some level of the
exchange i-ate.
The dotlai rises in value only if the demand for
dollars rises or the supply of dollars falls. But these
shifts con-espond to a rise in exports or- a fall in U.S.
imports. Since 1980, however, real exports generally
have fallen while real imports have nsen. Thus, move-
ments in n-dative demands for’ U.S. goods appear- to
have little to do with exchange i-ate developments
since 1980.
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The demand for U.S. and foreign goods and cones-
ponding demand and supply of dollar-s in for-eign
exchange mar-kets an-c inadequate explanations of re-
cent developments. Mon-c than goods and services at-c
traded among nalions. tJ.S.r-esidents also acquir-e real
and financial assets abroad, supplying dollars in inter’-
national exchange; likewise, foreigner-s acquire U.S.
real and fitiancial assets, demanding dollar-s in inter-
national exchange mar-kets to facilitate the exchange
When there is a shift in the demand and/or- supply
of dollams due to strch investment flows, the exchange
i-ate can also chatige. 1’hus, a r-ise in the value of the
dollar in inlernational exchange can occur’ either- be-
cause of an increase in for-eign investment iii the
tinited States (ii’because of a reduction in U.S. invest—
meritabr-oad. Most analyses of foreigriexchange devel-
opments emphasize the former-.” The latter-, however-,
has been the dominant for-ce in the 1980s”
Table 2 shows the swing fm-onn net U.S. investment
abroad to a net capital inflow. But this swing was not
due to gn-owth in foreign investment in the United
States.” Instead, the pace of U.S. investment abroad
slowed to a halt (anegative $0.5 billioni. The rise in the
dollam- from 1980 to 1985 primarily was associated with
a decline in the U.S. supply ofdollar-s in inten-national
exchange for foreign assets.”
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‘Iwo major-international factors weme the pr-oximate
causes of these fbreign exchange man-ket develop-
ments and the n-dativestr-ength of U.S. manufactirn-ing.
Fin-st, the 1981 tax act substantially impr-oved the r-ate
of i-eturn on investment itt the United States. This set
in motion a major reallocation in the won-Id capital
stock towar-d U.S. production and away flom foreign
pi-oduction. Economic capacity began rising in the
primarily the result of an unusually large demand for dollars from
foreigners wishing to buy dollar-denominated assets.”
“Netforeign investment in theUnited States generallyrose through-
out the period 111/1980 toll/i 985, but during the firsttwo years, both
U.S investment abroad and foreign investment in the United States
increased, especially in 1982.
“Whileforeign investment in theUnited States did not keep pace with
the growth in U.S. GNP, it did represent a major increase in such
outlays viewed from theforeign perspective. Recall that each dollar
of such investment had a foreign currency cost that was about 70
percent more in the yearending in Il/i 985 than it did in 1980. Viewed
from the foreign currency perspective, even an unchanged dollar
investment levelwould have been impressive.
“The other component of the supply of dollars in international ex-
change — U.S. import spending — also fell relative to U.S. GNP
over the period. In 1980, imports equaled 11.7 percent of GNP; this
declinedto 11.4 percent of GNP in the year ending in 11/1985.
Table 2










Net foreigninvestment in the United States $—28.0 —1.0% $ 77.0 2.0%
Foreigninvestment 58.1 2.1 76.5 2.0
US nnvestmentabroad 861 32 —05 00
“For example, see Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (1985): “It is
generally accepted that the rise in the dollar in recent years wasTable 3
The Annual Growth Rates of Real GNP
Across Countries
1980—84 1976—80 Change
United States 2.7% 3.2% — 0.5%
Canada 1.7 2.4 —0.7
Japan 3.8 5.0 —1.2
Belgium 0.5 1.9 “1.4
Denmark’ 2.0 1.5 0.5
France’ 1.1 2.8 --1.7
Germany 0.8 2.8 2.0
Italy’ 0.4 3.3 —2.9
Netherlands 0.0 3.3 —3.3
Norway 22 44 —22
Sweden’ 15 12 03
Unnted Knngdomt 1 3 1 20 1
Real gross domestic product where mndncated
linited Stales relative to that in the nest ofthe won-Id
Second, hr addition to the n-eduction ofoutput gro~vth
abr’oad due to a relative capacity loss, cyclical l’on’res
contnilinted to a loss itt output and income growth
abroad 3’ As a m’esnlt, foi-eign demand and consn nit
tiont of goods expom-ted and innpon-ted liv the United
States fell n-elatiye to U.S. dornestic dennand, depm-ess—
ing world hr-ices of tn’aded goods.
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Table 3 shows the growth i-ates of neal UN P in t2
countries during the period of dollar’ depreciation.
1976—80, and dun’ing 1980—84, when the dollar’appreci—
“The decline in the costof capital relative to that abroad was not the
only factor accounting for differential capacity growth. See below.
There is considerable disagreement among analysts concerning the
effects of taxes on the cost of capital and investment, Many argue
that 1982 tax changes repealed the 1981 investment incentives.
Bosworth (1985) and Slemrod (1986) present the view that invest-
ment was not boosted by tax law changes. Meyer (1984) arguesthat
the net costof capital was lowered on average. He alsonotes areas
where it was raised. Two of the strongest areas of investment,
business automobilesand commercialand industrial buildings, are
areas where Meyer shows the largest reduction in the net cost of
capital. Also, seeTatom (1985).
“The monetary approach to the balance of payments emphasizes
relative money stock and real income growth. See Kemp (1975). for
example. Heshows that, in the monetary approach, an appreciation
of the exchange rate occurs when domestic money stock growth
slows, or when domestic real income growth accelerates relative to
that in the rest of the world.
ated, In the ear-her period, U.S - real UNP growth was
exceeded in Japat’i. Norway, Italy amid the Nethen-lands -
Oven’ the later’ pen-iod. all of the count m-ies except Japait
showed slower gn-owth I ban the United States. NIore
rmnpon-tant, the gr-owth n-ate slowed in 1980—84 n-c Ia—
tively more than in the Uttited States in every count rv
but the United Kingdont, Dentntiam’k and Sweden,
where real output growth was slttggish in both peri-
ods.
Unemployment developntertts show the same rela-
tively poor- perlor-rnance in oIlier countr-ies - The am-ca
encompassing the Eum-opeant member-s of the On-ganti—
zation for’ Economic Cooper-anion arid tievelopment
26 countriesl showed an increase iii unemployrner’rt
fr-ont 6.1 per-cern of the labor’ force in 1980 tnt 10.7
per-ccitt in 1984. Over the ear-lien’ period, unemploy-
ment roseless. t.np from 5.4 pen-cent in 1976. In Canada,
the unernplovrnertt n-ate rose fnont 7.1 pen-cent itt 1976
to 7.4 pen-cent itt 1980, then to 11.3 pert:ent in 1984. In
Japan, the unemployment n-ate was the same in) 1980
as in 1976, at 2 pen-ccitt of the lalior Ion-ce, then r-ose to
2.7 percent in 1984. In contn-ast, the unemplovment
tate in the United States jell from 7.6 ~ie ‘cenit itt 1976 to
7.0 percent itt 1980. From 1980 to 1984, Ihe rale rose 0.5
percentage points, a smaller- mci-ease than itt the 26
countries of OECD—Enn-opc, Canada or Japan.’’
Another way tosee whether for-cign exchange devel—
opnttentts have weakened U.S. manufactuning is tn ex-
amine trends itt martufactu mnrig i it other cottntlies
frorti 1976 to 1980, when the exchange value of the
dollar generally fell an-nil fn-om 1980 to 1984. when it
rose Accon-dirtg to the exchange rate argument, if U.S.
production was weakened by the rise in the exchange
n-ate, for-eign nunIiotis wotill be cxl.iected to have had
stronger manufacturing output growth (Inc to their
falling exchange m-ate.
Astable 4 shows. the gr-o~~’tlt n-ate of U.S. rnanufactun-—
ing output from 1980 to 1984 was second only to that
“The dominance of the improvement in the relative growth of the U.S.
economy in accounting for the rise in the value in the dollar is
reinforced by the fact that between 1976—80 and 1980—85, the
growth rate of Ml accelerated in the United States, but slowed in all
the othercountries shown in table 3. Such monetarytrends would be
expected tolower the value of the dollar against these other curren-
cres.
“The latest year for which the data used is available for all the
countries examined is 1984. The data on manufacturing in table 4
and table 5 below are Bureau of Labor Statistics measures de-
scribed by Dean. Boissevain, and Thomas (19B6).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OFSt LOUIS - APRIL 1986
Table 4
Annual Growth Rates of Manufacturing Output and the Effective Exchange Rate
inJapan. Mom’eoven-, such growth rose by more than in
any nation shown except Sweden amid the tirtited
Kingdont3’ If the trends inn each country in table 4 are
irtfluenced by exchange developments, then eaclt
country’s exchange n-ate index against all other- cur-—
t-entcies would lie mmnpnirtant.r~Front 1980 to 1984, the
effective cxcham’nge nate of each cniuntry’s cun-rencv in
table 4 fell, antd fell faster tItan from 1976 to 1980,
except itt the tinited States, Cantada arid .Iapan - In
-Iapan and Canada, like the United States, the cum-rentc
apprecia ted in 1980—84 relative to its change mt 1976—
80.
Only Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom
show a negative r’elationship between changes in tlte
value of the coontry’s cur-n-encvand the growthr-ate of
its manufacturing sector. The evidemtce is riot itt—
tended to show that ant appn-eciatimtg cUi-temtcv is al-
ways associated with relatively stromtg manufact mining
growth, since such a comiciusion is as questionable as
“It might be objected that the countries examined in the table are not
representative of the areas where trade and production have
shifted. In the first half 011985, however, Europe, Canada and
Japan accounted for 63.1 of U.S. imports and 59.8 percent of U.S.
exports, up from 50.4 percent and 56.4 percent, respectively, in
1980. The rise in the shares more than offset a decline in these
countries’ importance in U.S. trade from 1975 to 1980. Another
indicator is that world exports (including or excluding the United
States) declined from 1980 to 1984, following nearly 2D percent
annual growth in the earlier period.
“The effective exchange rate is a weighted average of the value of a
country’s currency relative to other currencies. It is constructed by
the InternationalMonetary Fund and described in more detail in their
International Monetary Statistics Yearbook (1985), pp. 6—7.
tIme comttrary view. But this has beent the case for- nine
of12 countries imt the 1980s, and them-c is little evidence
that U.S - manufacturi mng output was weakened or’ that
it lost out to fon’eign contpetitor-s.
A key par-t ofthe international explanation of mamtt,m—
factoring output growth in thin) UnIted States is that the.
comttpetitive position of this sector worsened due to
foreign competition aminl the strength nif the dollar. A
look at the data (in factor costs and productivity,
however-, does riot r-eveal a deter-iorationt itt L.J .S. corn—
petitiveness -
The impm-oved expected real cash flow
available to business following the 1981 lax act led to
amt increase in domestic investment nlennartnl.” Of
co m n-se, relatively strontgeri n \‘es t muemit incr-eases
financing (Iemands, m’aisintg the real n-ate of n-etnm-mm (in)
financial iristrunients including stocks, bonds and
shom’t—ter-mni nlebt. lInt for-eigr’r pm-oducer-s did riot gain
from acceletated cost m’ecovery, lowem- corpon-ate ut —
come tax rates or’ the cxtension ofthe investmen t tax
cm-edit mt the United States - Inst cad, they simply had to
adj mist to the higher real rates of return r’eqtrmid on
fimtancma I inst rn ments ant I rtal assets in) the won-hI
capital mitarket - ‘Fhr.rs, the inten-natiotial competitive—
rtess of t ,5~ industry gener-allv improved.
Manufacturing OutputGrowth
1980—84 1976-80 Change 1980—84 1976—80 Change
EffectiveExchange Rate
United States 3.4% 2.6% 0.8% 9.5% --2.8% 12.3%
Canada 0.6 2.4 —1.8 1.5 —5.5 7.0
Japan 7.4 7.0 0.4 5.5 5.0 0.5
Belgium 1.3 1.9 —0.6 —6.0 3.0 —9.0
Denmark 1.8 3.1 -1.3 —5.7 —0.9 —4.8
France 0.7 2.6 -. 1.9 — 8.6 —0.3 -- 8.3
Germany 0.2 2.1 —1.9 --1.0 5.3 —6.3
Italy —0.5 4.2 --4.7 —8.2 ---5.0 ‘-3.2
Netherlands 1.0 1.9 —0.9 —1.3 4.0 —5.3
Norway 0.0 0.0 0.0 —3.9 —0.5 —3.4
Sweden 2.0 —0.5 2.5 —7.7 ‘-‘2.1 —5.6
United Kingdom 0.2 ‘—1.7 1.9 —4.9 2.9 --7.8
“Thestrength of U.S. domestic saving and investmentis discussed in
Tatom (1985).Table 5
Growth Rates of Manufacturing Unit Labor Cost, Productivity and Real Wages
Unit labor cost growth Productivity growth
1980—84 1976—80 Change 1980-84 1976—80 Change
UnitedStates 2.3% 8.3% --6.0% 4.0% 1.1% 2.9%
Canada 62 82 —2.0 2.3 1.4 0.9
Japan —0.8 0.6 — 1.4 5.5 6.8 — 1.3
Belgium 1.8 3.7 —1.9 5.7 5.9 —0.2
Denmark 6.5 6.5 0.0 1.3 3.9 —2.6
France 8.0 8.9 —0.9 5.0 4.2 0.8
Germany 1.7 5.1 --3.4 3.6 2.9 0.7
Italy 13.5 12.6 0.9 3.6 4.3 —0.7
Netherlands 0.3 3.1 —-2.8 5.2 4.4 0.8
Norway 6.9 7.0 —0.1 2.7 2.3 0.4
Sweden 4.9 7.1 —2.2 4.1 2.6 1.5
United Kingdom 3.5 16.4 —12.9 5.7 0.1 5.6
Real wage growth Manufacturing employment growth
1980—84 1976—SO Change 1980—84 1976—SO Change
United States 0.3% 0.2% 0.5% —1.0% 1.7% --- 2.7%
Canada 0.3 0.7 —0.4 —1.4 1.1 —2.5
Japan 1.7 1.4 0.3 1.5 --0.3 1.8
Belgium 0.1 4.0 —3.9 —3.2 —3.3 0.1
Denmark - 0.8 0.0 ---0.8 0.2 --0.5 0.7
France 2.6 2.5 0.1 —2.5 --1.1 —1.4
Germany 1.0 4.3 --3.3 —2.8 0.3 --2.5
Italy 2.2 0.3 1.9 --2.8 ---0.1 --2.7
Netherlands 0.8 2.2 --- 1,4 --3.6 --1.8 -- 1.8
Norway —Oi 1.2 —1.3 —2.8 --0.8 -2.0
Sweden —0.5 — 0.2 —0.3 —2.4 — 1.5 - 0.9
United Kingdom 1.8 2.1 --0.3 —5.6 -1.2 -4.4
Another key finctor in(lnencintg rout-
par-ative cnists is the cost of labor per unit (if outpnt.
‘I’ahle 5 cornpa res manufacturing (mit labor cost
acm’oss conritn-nes. In the limst colun in, the male of in—
cm-ease itt mmmii labor cost is shown for- the per-ionl of
dollar’ appreciation fr-nm 1980 to t984. The r-ate of
increase mt unIt labor- cnist is not the slowest itt the
UmIted States, tbough it is well below tIre rate mt nnaniy
of I lie connitmies shown -
tnt the secottd arid third col(mumis, tlie tate of in —
cretse in trnit labor’ cost over the Iien-uid of dol lam’
depm-eciatiom I, 197(5—80, and the difl’em’ences between
tInetwo periods an-c shown. fri the 1976—80 liem’iod , the
pace of mnit labor cost increase in the t rtitcdl States
was amuong the hightest shown - Them-c is a whIc gap
between the slowing in the United Stales and that in
the othen’ JO counttries shown. iltn 5, ti-ends in tm it
niannufacturing mmnpn’oved over the recent four ~‘ears.
- A niajom lacton’ accounting for’ the im-
pm-overtien t in) until labor cost is arelative innpm-ovement
inn productivity gm’owth inn ntanufacturmmtg. While U.S.
niantufactur-ing pt-oductivitv gr-niwth from 1980 to t984
was about avet-age conti par-ed with tlit nit hem’ conntries,
it improved sharply from thin) t976—80 period, when it
was much lower- thiant in) 10 of the other’ tI eountm-ies
shown in table 5,
Table 5 also indicates m-eal wage develop-
merits over thie two pem-iods.” Real wage movementts
reflect changes in supply and demand. Thnns,am-ise in
real wages cati occu m’ due to cither a imtcr’ease inn the
‘6Real wage growth in each country is measured by the rate of
increase in hourly compensation in manufacturing deflated by the
consumer price index in each country. Similar results are found
deflating by the price indexes for manufacturing or industrial prices
published by the IMF. labor- cost snrggest that the comnpetit iveness of t,i.S.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OFSt LOUIS APRIL 1998 ?~
demand fom’labor- or- a m-ise imi the supply price of labor’,
or some comhinnation thereof. In the former case, em-
ployment tends to r-ise, while in the latten’ case em—
plovment tennis to fall. Thus, evidence nm meal wages
alone does riot indicate whether demantd, supply or
both am-c c.hatgi rig.
The implication of thie internationiah explaniation,
however-, is that, by shifting the demanid fon’ ntanufac—
tur-ing output away from the Uniteni Slates towam-d
toreigni competitom’s, the niennand fnir faliot- atir’oad
would ntse and that in the t,Jnited States would fall. As
aresult, n-calwages imi the UnIted States woulnh tend tni
decline n-dative to those in nither-counitrmes. Real wage
gr-owth in theUniited States was higher inn 1980—84 than
it was in the ear-lien’ pen-iod~however. i’his inipr-ove—
went was larger’ itt the t!nited States than in ahl the
other- countries except Italy. Indeed, mi eight of the
other nations real wage gr-owth fell between the two
pen’nods.
‘t’he gro%vthi nif manufacturing employ—
uncut itt the 12 coumitmies is shoi-vniat the end niftable 5,
It, too, is at odds with the view that manufacturing
output and ennploynnent art beitig red istrihi tmted away
from the United States. While the Iable i t)dI cates that
U.S. mart rmlacttnm’inig employment declined fn-o mu 1980
to 1984, tbne decline compares favor-alihv to develop—
nnents in) the other 11 countries. Only Japan amid Den—
nian-k showeni ant increase in emplniynrnent over the
t980—84 perinmd±
The decline in employment gr-owth in the United
States oven’ the two pnnm-idinls is among the largest in the
table. As tahile 4 intdicates, however-, fItis dcclinc was
n-nit due to n-educed output gt-owth. Instead, the die—
clinic r-eflects the r-elatively 5 tmong pace of pnonluctivit
gr-ow-tbi in rtatiufactnmirig diver- the n-ecent pet-ionl-
The use of annmnral r-ates of gr-owth choes riot fully
illuminiate the clmanitatnc diffen’ences that have oc-
cur-n-ed in manufacturing employment itcross the
counttries. Oven- the full peniod it table 5, only Japan
and the United States showed gr-owth in ntanufactun’—
ing employment, hut it was up less than 5 percemmt in
each case 12.7 and! 4.9 per-ceril, respectively; after eight
27Fieleke (1985) has shown that there is no correlation between the
growth of import penetration in various U.S. industries and their
employment growth over the 1980—84 period. McKenzie and Smith
(1986) find that textile imports in the early 1980s and in the period
1960—84 had no significant negative effect on employment in the
U.S. textile and apparel industries. They do findsome evidence that
apparel imports have affected employment in the apparel industry.
They find that the dominant factor influencing employment in these
industries has been relatively rapid productivity growth in both
industries.
years. Itt Canada and Dentmark, such eruploymnemiI fell
ahiout I per-cent oven- the eight year-s. Inn Fm-ance, Gem-—
many, Italy, Non-way and Sweden, the rechuctioni was
ahniut 9t o15 pel’cdrit . In the Nether-lands, Belgium and
the United Kingdlon’n such employment fell liv 21) to 24
pen-cent. tf then-c is a n-edistn-ihntion of employment
going on, it appear-s to be stn-onglv in favor of the
UnIted States and Japan.
Finally, energy prices are another cost of pro-
duction that has moved clown in the United States
cnmntpan-edl with such pnces ahn-oad. Itt the United
States, ener~vpr-ices have declined relative lo the
prices of business output. This is itt sharp contrast to
dlevelopments ahn-oad. Since oil is a major sour-ce of
enen-gv at-ound the won-Id and dither soun-ces of enen-gy
compete with it, a Inmok at the real pm-ice ofoil in various
conritn-ies is sufficient. Table 6 shows the 1980—84
change in the m’eal cost of oil to domestic and foreign
prodkncers,2~ While this pt-ice fell at a 5.2 Iierce.nt mate
fi-nim 1980 to 1984 in the Unitedi States, itgenet’ally rose
ahiroad, Only Japan shows a decline like that in the
United States. In Italy arid Norway, such pr-ints were
ne.am-ly unchanged, but itt the other eight eonnitm-ies
shon,vn, the price nif oil rose sharply n-dative to prices nif
goods and services genen-allv.
‘I’hius, it is dlitfi ,ult to argue I hat Ilie in)ten-national
competitivetiess nif U.S. industtv has hieett hurt by tine
rise in thievalue nmf the doilan-from 1980—85. t-’or capital
and enen-gv resources, it appear-s that factor pr-ices
have not tisen m-elative tn) cmutp tnt him-ices in the [ Jnited
States, especially when cornpat’ed with theexpem’ience
of fon’eigni competitnmn-s. For labor-, it does not appear
that n-cal wages in the United States have been de—
pressed n-dative to those abnoad. ‘llie positive relation—
ship between the gm-myth oftJ,S. mantufacttrrinig output
alidi the rise in the exchange value of the dollar’appam-—
ently reflects impm-oved competitiveness of U.S. mann—
factun-ing.
2SThe dollarprice ofimported oil in theUnited States is representative
of the world price since oil is priced in dollars around the world and,
except for differences in taxes and transportation costs, the U.S.
price is representative of the price for firms in other nations. The
local currency price of oil is assumed to be the average cost of
imported oil in the United States (dollars per barrel) multiplied by the
exchange rate between the local currency and the dollar (foreign
currency/dollar). For Canada, the industry selling price for petro-
leum and coal products is used instead of the price of imported oil,
The industry selling price for petroleum refineries shows the same
annual rate of increase. Canada, like the U.S. in 1980, had signifi-
cant regulations on domestic oil and energy prices, so that the
imported price of oil is not representative of local costs. In the U.S.
case, the average cost of oil to domestic refiners is used to measure
the dollar price of Oil. These local prices of oil are deflated by the
consumer price index foraach country to examine movements in the
real costof oil in the various countries.RESERVE SANK OF- ST.
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Manufactun-ing output in the United States does not
appear to have been adversely affected by exchange
rate developments since 1980. Except for- the cclical
decline associated with the 1980 and 1981—82 meces-
sions, manufactuning output has maintained its share
in real GNPand has shown faithyrapid growth. Indeed,
the evidence indicates that, during the 1980s, suchi
output has gm-own 2.0 percentage points fasten- than
the 1948—SQrelationship ofsuch output to n-eah income
would predict. Of course, since manufacturing pt-o-
duction rose wiule exports fell and imports m-ose, U.S.
purchases of such goods nose rapidly. It) effect, U.S.
consumption was naised not only due to increased
pn-ocluction, but also hy pun-chasing U.S. pn-odtmcts that
formerly wen-e expotted and lon-eign pmodiucts that
fornietly wen-e put’chased abroad.
No doubt the nise in the value of the dollar’ n-c—
strained the gn-owthi of demanni for- U.S.-manufactur-ed
pn-oducts. But the appreciation of the dohhar in pam-t
simply offset in pnovenienits in the r-ehative cnist advami—
tages of IfS. pn-oducen-s oven’ fon-eign competitors. In
industries in which these cnist advatitages wem-e un-
usually stn-ong on’ weak, the gains in prodhuction and
employment wen-e relatively stn-onger or weaken- than
the data for’ the whole nnarunfactw-ing secton- indicate.
‘l’hus, there am-e likely to lie industries in whiichi the misc
in the exchange value of the dollar’ bias exerted stm-ong
negative inilluences nmni pm-oduction, prices antI em—
ployment that wem-e not offset by relative cost inn-
pmovernents5’
Manufactum-ing output gn-owth abn’oad has not
shown the expected gains that would occut- if the
exchange mate alone were realhocating won-Iddemand
and production of such goods. Duming the period of
dollar appreciation, production growth showed
sham-ply in most other-countries. These dlevelopnients
reflect a m-edistn’ihution of capital and output toward
the United States and away ft-om othem countn-ies. The
evidence suggests that this redistribution and the ap-
preciation of the dollar n-eflect the m’elative cost im-
provements in U.S. pn-oduction.
‘I’he irony, then, is that the new-found conventional
wisdom, which holds that the n’ise in the dollar bias
weakened the competitive position of U.S. tnanufac—
tun-ing, not only appean-s to be incon-n’ect, hut it reverses
the dominant positive n-elationship and it obscures the
m-ecent strength of U.S. manufactun-ing. Adjustedl for
normal cyclical movements in the United States, man-
ufacturing output bias been nelatively strong in the
1980s; thus is in lan-ge part n-elated to the innpm-nivements
in the competitiveness and n-cal tate of n-etun-n in U.S.
manufacturing and!, hence, the appreciation in the
value ofthe dollar in the eanly 1980s. Nonetheless, the
inten-natiotial explanation has led to calls fon- pnotec-
tionist and! monetary andl fiscal actions to drive the
exchange value of the dollan’ down. Such actions am-c
likely to m-etan-d the otherwise impn-oving connpetitive-
n’ness of U.S. manufactum-ing.
At least in the United States, exchange n-ate move-
ments ovem the eight yeats from 1976 to 1984 appear- to
n-eflect policy—induced and other changes in U.S.
internaticmnah competitiveness. ‘l’hus, economic poli-
cies that promote boiv inflation and fastet’ or mon-c
stable gr-owth appear- to lie n-elatively mom-c iniportant
for tJ.S. manufacturing than the exchange n-ate conse-
quences of economic policy or other exchange n-ate
developments.
‘~Output growth rates in the 10 industries in manufacturing industrial
production indicate that three — transportation equipment (espe-
cially motor vehicles and parts), lumber and products, and printing
and publishing — showed faster than average growth in 1980—84
and their growth rate was higherthan it had been in 1976—80. The
only sectorwhere growth in 1980—84 wasbelow averageandslower
than in 1976—80 was fabricated metal products. Other industries
(primary metals, apparel and products, chemicals and products,
foods, electrical, and non-electrical machinery) showed mixed
resultson thesecriteria. For example, the two machinery industries
showed the largest declines in 1980—84 from growth in the earlier
period, but their growth exceeded the average for all 10 industries
over the recent period.APRIL 1986 :4~
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